Skip to content

fix: Security fixes for Triton HMAC key exposure and missing integrit…#5656

Open
pravali96 wants to merge 2 commits intoaws:master-v2from
pravali96:fix/triton-hmac-security-v2-all-bugs
Open

fix: Security fixes for Triton HMAC key exposure and missing integrit…#5656
pravali96 wants to merge 2 commits intoaws:master-v2from
pravali96:fix/triton-hmac-security-v2-all-bugs

Conversation

@pravali96
Copy link
Collaborator

@pravali96 pravali96 commented Mar 19, 2026

Issue #, if available:

Description of changes:
Security fixes for HMAC key exposure and missing integrity check in the Triton inference handler and all model server prepare paths.

Issue

Three security issues were identified in the sagemaker-serve package:

  1. Missing integrity check in Triton handler (CWE-502): triton/model.py deserialized serve.pkl via cloudpickle.load() with no integrity verification before execution. A # TODO comment at line 32 acknowledged this gap. All other handlers (TorchServe, MMS, TF Serving, SMD) already had this check.

  2. Hardcoded secret key for ONNX path (CWE-798): model_builder_utils.py set self.secret_key = "dummy secret key for onnx backend" in the Triton ONNX export path. This was passed as SAGEMAKER_SERVE_SECRET_KEY into container environment variables and exposed in plaintext via DescribeModel API. The ONNX path does not use pickle serialization, so no secret key is needed.

  3. HMAC secret key exposed via environment variables (CWE-200, CWE-522): All model server implementations injected the HMAC secret key as SAGEMAKER_SERVE_SECRET_KEY into container environment variables. These are returned in plaintext by DescribeModel, DescribeEndpointConfig, and DescribeModelPackage APIs, allowing any principal with read permissions to extract the key and forge valid integrity signatures for malicious pickle payloads.

Fix

Switch from HMAC-SHA256 (requires a secret key) to plain SHA-256 (no key needed), matching the approach taken for CVE-2026-1777 (PR #5348/#5379) which made the same change for the remote function path.

Changes

check_integrity.py

  • Removed generate_secret_key() — no longer needed
  • compute_hash() now uses hashlib.sha256() instead of hmac.new()
  • perform_integrity_check() no longer reads SAGEMAKER_SERVE_SECRET_KEY from environment

By submitting this pull request, I confirm that you can use, modify, copy, and redistribute this contribution, under the terms of your choice.

@pravali96 pravali96 requested a review from a team as a code owner March 19, 2026 22:58
@pravali96 pravali96 requested a review from mollyheamazon March 19, 2026 22:58
@pravali96 pravali96 force-pushed the fix/triton-hmac-security-v2-all-bugs branch from 6e9283e to 8fe96c8 Compare March 20, 2026 17:48
…y check (v2)

Backport of v3 security fixes for P400136088 and V2146375387.

1. check_integrity.py: Switch from HMAC-SHA256 to plain SHA-256.
   Remove generate_secret_key, remove env var dependency.

2. triton/model.py: Add integrity check in initialize() BEFORE
   cloudpickle deserialization.

3. triton/server.py: Remove SAGEMAKER_SERVE_SECRET_KEY from
   container environment variables.

4. triton/triton_builder.py: Remove hardcoded dummy secret key
   for ONNX path. Rename _hmac_signing to _compute_integrity_hash.
   Use plain SHA-256.

5. All prepare.py files (torchserve, mms, tf_serving, smd):
   Remove generate_secret_key usage, switch to plain SHA-256.
@pravali96 pravali96 force-pushed the fix/triton-hmac-security-v2-all-bugs branch from c8d05ec to 079e1f2 Compare March 20, 2026 19:08
Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

Labels

None yet

Projects

None yet

Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

1 participant