This project intentionally uses only documented Cursor surfaces:
- Cursor CLI (
agent) - Cursor Cloud Agents API (
https://api.cursor.com/v0/...)
It does not reverse-engineer private Cursor endpoints.
- Cursor CLI can read your repository and run shell commands depending on your Cursor CLI permissions.
- In print mode,
--forceenables file edits without confirmation.
Mitigation:
- Configure Cursor CLI permissions (
~/.cursor/cli-config.jsonor<project>/.cursor/cli.json) to allow only what you need. - Deny reads of sensitive files like
.env*.
- OpenCode custom tools run on your machine.
- Even if OpenCode permissions are strict, a buggy/malicious plugin could still execute code.
Mitigation:
- Only install plugins you trust.
- Gate tool usage in OpenCode with
permissionrules (requireask).
cursor_cli_patch:
- Creates a temporary
git worktreedirectory. - Runs Cursor CLI inside it with
--force. - Produces a
git diffpatch. - Removes the temp worktree (may use
git worktree remove --forceon the temp directory).
This is designed to prevent Cursor from editing your main working tree directly.
Cloud Agents run in a remote Ubuntu environment with internet access and auto-run terminal commands.
Mitigation:
- Only use Cloud Agents on repos where remote execution is acceptable.
- Avoid passing secrets in prompts.
- Prefer using Cursor’s Cloud Agent Secrets management (Cursor Settings → Cloud Agents → Secrets) instead of committing
.envfiles.